Quantitative Easing Explained

More on Quantitative Easing from an excerpt from the Wall Street Journal I read earlier this year:

At the height of the housing bubble, hedge-fund manager Paul Singer was shorting subprime mortgages. By the spring of 2007, he was warning regulators on both sides of the Atlantic that the world was facing a major financial crisis.

They ignored him. Now the founder of Elliott Management says the biggest banks are headed for another credit meltdown. Among the likely triggers for the next crisis, Mr. Singer sees one leading candidate: Monetary policy "is extremely risky," he says, "the risk being massive inflation."

In some areas gas prices have reached $4 per gallon, and now Americans must brace themselves for higher grocery bills. This week the Labor Department reported that February wholesale food prices posted their sharpest increase since 1974. News like that has driven Mr. Singer to the history books: He treats visitors to his 5th Avenue office to a copy of a 1931 treatise on German currency debasement, Constantino Bresciani-Turroni's "The Economics of Inflation."

Mr. Singer—who launched Elliott in 1977 and has delivered a 14.3% compound annual return (compared to the S&P 500's 10.9%)—is not comparing today's Federal Reserve to the Reichsbank of the early 1920s. Rather, he's once again warning financial regulators. This time the message is: Don't take for granted investor faith in a major currency.

While at Harvard Law School, Mr. Singer turned down a research job with his intellectual hero, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, to pursue a career in finance. Today, he's still looking for heroes among the stewards of the major currencies. Central bankers, particularly at the Fed but also in Europe, "seem to be acting as if they have unlimited flexibility to ease monetary policy," he says.

He specifically targets the Fed's "unprecedented" policy of sustaining near-zero interest rates and its exercise in money-printing, "Quantitative Easing 2," that has it buying medium- and longer-term securities from the Treasury. "In effect they're treating confidence in fiat money—in paper money—as inexhaustible, that it's a tool that's able to be used not just in the throes of crisis," but also as "a virtually complete substitute for sound fiscal, regulatory and taxing policy."

Fed officials, he adds, "really seem to think that inflation is something they can deal with very easily and very quickly. I don't believe they're right." He notes that, in the late 1970s, inflation was only in the high single digits yet curing it required interest rates of 20% and a collapse of the bond market.

Mr. Singer further warns that investors shouldn't misinterpret apparently bullish signals from a rising market. "Of course printing money is going to support asset prices," but "it's very dangerous" and is not a substitute for trade, tax and regulatory reforms that make America an attractive place for job creation.

"What would a loss of confidence in the dollar actually look like? Gold going absolutely nuts," adds Mr. Singer, who is also a major donor to conservative intellectual causes and think tanks such as the Manhattan Institute. He observes that prices for many commodities are already near all-time highs, even with "kind of a soft recovery" in the U.S. and Europe, and robust growth in Asia. "Imagine if hoarding, speculation, investment positions in [hard assets] accumulate to cause commodities and gold to go rocketing up. Wages, prices will follow," he says.

As destructive as raging inflation would be, why would it hurt the big financial institutions? It could wreak havoc on the ability of big banks' corporate customers to make good on their obligations, Mr. Singer believes—and financial reform did little to reduce risks.

Read the complete article from James Freeman and the WSJ by clicking here